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Financial liberalisation, bank ownership type and performance in a transition economy: 1 
the case of Vietnam 2 
Abstract 3 
Employing a sample of Vietnamese banks covering the period 2005 to 2015, this study 4 
investigates the influence of partial, and selective, financial liberalisation on bank efficiency 5 
by ownership type in a transition economy. The key findings are: (1) state-owned banks 6 
outperformed all other ownership types; (2) selective privatisation of state-owned banks 7 
exerted a positive influence on bank efficiency; (3) rural-to-urban private bank 8 
transformation decreased banking system efficiency; (4) minority foreign ownership exerted 9 
an insignificant impact on bank efficiency; (5) business group ownership improved the 10 
provision of intermediation services but deteriorated overall bank operating efficiency. 11 
Overall, the findings suggest that the post-WTO partial-liberalisation of the banking system 12 
in Vietnam impacted banks’ efficiency differently subject to ownership type, with potentially 13 
adverse implications for long term economic growth and development.  14 
JEL Classifications: D24, G21 15 
Keywords: bank efficiency; financial liberalisation; ownership type; business environment; 16 
Vietnam; data envelopment analysis; generalised difference-in-differences. 17 
1. Introduction 18 
Transition towards market oriented economies by the formerly centrally planned European 19 
and Asian nations in the late 1980s and early 1990s triggered the adoption of economic 20 
liberalisation policies. Foremost among these was financial liberalisation focused on 21 
transforming state dominated banking systems from single to two-tier structures. This 22 
increased competition and transformed state to private ownership in the sector. Banking 23 
system liberalisation, however, varied among transition economies in terms of both scope of 24 
coverage and speed of implementation. Generally, two broad approaches emerged. The first 25 
2 
 
involved full liberalisation without limits with all banks treated equally regardless of 26 
ownership (public, private and foreign). Publicly-owned banks no longer dominated the 27 
market nor were they used as vehicles for the enactment of state policies. This type of 28 
liberalisation (the so-called ‘big bang’ approach) was adopted in many of the former 29 
transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe, where transformation to a competitive and 30 
primarily privately controlled banking sector has largely been implemented (Bonin et al., 31 
2005a; 2005b; Fries and Taci, 2005; Havrylchyk, 2006; Kraft et al., 2006; Karas et al., 2010; 32 
Bonin and Schnabel, 2011). The second approach involved gradual and incremental 33 
liberalisation, where state-owned banks remained as dominant players and key policy 34 
facilitators, while retaining competitive advantages in terms of implicit government 35 
guarantees, less risk and access to cheaper funding. A gradual liberalisation approach has 36 
been prevalent in the banking systems of countries such as China, Russia and Vietnam.  37 
The aim of this study is to evaluate the impact of the gradual or incremental approach to 38 
banking sector reform adopted by Vietnam on the efficiency of various categories of banks 39 
based on their ownership type. Improving banking sector efficiency is critical for the 40 
promotion of economic growth in countries with a predominantly bank-based financial 41 
system, as is the case in Vietnam (Hasan et al., 2009; Koetter and Wedow, 2010). For 42 
transition economies more generally, Koivu (2002) provides evidence to suggest that banking 43 
sector efficiency is particularly important in facilitating economic growth in transition 44 
countries. Evidence as to which type of bank ownership best drives efficiency is, however, 45 
mixed. Levine (2001) argues that economic growth is most effectively achieved through 46 
international financial liberalisation that enables foreign banks greater access to the domestic 47 
market, while La Porta et al. (2002) argue that state ownership of banks slows financial 48 
development. On the other hand, Andrianova et al. (2012) argue that long run economic 49 
growth is improved by government ownership of banks. The discriminatory nature of the 50 
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banking reforms adopted in Vietnam, specifically against domestic private and foreign-51 
owned banks, and the resulting banking sector distortions and inefficiencies, has the 52 
potential, therefore, to adversely impact the future growth and development of the economy. 53 
 The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the Vietnamese banking sector 54 
after the abandonment of central planning and adoption of market oriented reform measures. 55 
Section 3 provides an overview of the banking efficiency-ownership type literature for the 56 
case of transition economies. The bank efficiency measurement methodology adopted, 57 
including data envelopment analysis (DEA) and double bootstrap DEA, is presented in 58 
Section 4. Section 5 describes the data and specifies inputs/outputs. Section 6 describes the 59 
explanatory variables used in the regression models and presents an analysis of the empirical 60 
results, while Section 7 highlights key findings and policy implications. 61 
2. The Vietnamese banking sector 62 
At its sixth National Congress in December 1986, the Communist Party of Vietnam made a 63 
decisive step to abandon central planning and adopt, instead, a socialist market-oriented 64 
system. This became known as ‘Doi Moi’ (renovation) (Harvie and Hoa, 1997; Beresford, 65 
2008). Accordingly, the mono-bank system, which only served the needs and demands of the 66 
state sector, was split into a two-tier banking system with the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) 67 
playing the key role of central bank on one tier and state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) 68 
as lenders on the other. The new system also permitted the entry of private banks in the form 69 
of joint-stock banks (JSBs) and a limited presence of overseas investors in joint-venture 70 
banks. The JSBs faced many difficulties not only in terms of financial capacity but also in 71 
terms of managerial capability. During the 1990s a large proportion of SOCB loans were 72 
allocated to inefficiently operating SOEs; a legacy of the period of central planning which 73 
continues to persist today (Oh, 1999; Beresford, 2008; World Bank, 2014). 74 
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The East Asian Financial Crisis (EAFC), and its exposure of institutional and structural 75 
weaknesses, resulted in economic slowdown between 1998 and 2000, and provided further 76 
impetus for reform of the Vietnamese banking sector (Kovsted et al., 2005). Reform 77 
measures included: building a robust regulatory and supervisory framework; improving the 78 
quality of domestic banks, focusing especially on SOCBs through the separation of policy 79 
lending from commercial lending; writing off bad loans; bank recapitalisation, technical 80 
support and the enhancement of risk management strategies. Despite this series of reform 81 
measures, the banking sector remained largely ‘off limits’ to overseas investors. Indeed, 82 
during the pre-WTO entry period (i.e. pre 2007), overseas investors were only allowed to 83 
take part in the banking sector through a limited presence in joint-venture banks or through 84 
participation in a limited number of bank branches in Vietnam. Overseas investors were also 85 
not permitted to open 100 per cent foreign-owned banks or participate in domestic banks as 86 
shareholders. This was to change, however, as a requirement for Vietnam’s entry into the 87 
WTO on 11 January 2007. The composition of the Vietnamese banking sector by different 88 
bank ownership types after WTO entry and up to December 2016 is summarised in Table 1. 89 
<TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE> 90 
The entry of Vietnam into the WTO resulted in an increased presence of foreign banks from 91 
April 2007 and allowed wholly foreign-owned banks to participate in the banking sector 92 
(Pincus, 2009). These foreign banks were now allowed to receive deposits and lend in 93 
Vietnamese dong, but their operations remained largely confined to major commercial 94 
centres such as Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi. This entry also prompted additional reforms 95 
aimed at enhancing the competitiveness and efficiency of domestic banks. Reforms included 96 
allowing for the partial privatisation of SOCBs and providing foreign investors with rights to 97 
purchase equity in domestic banks. Total foreign investment in Vietnamese joint-stock 98 
commercial banks, however, was limited to 30 per cent of each bank’s chartered capital. 99 
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Opening the banking market to foreign investment generated concerns over the 100 
competitiveness of domestic banks.1 Both SOCBs and JSBs faced difficulties from low 101 
efficiency, out-of-date technology and limited capital. The government’s 2006 Decree 141 102 
increased the required minimum notional capital levels of all credit institutions (IMF, 2012; 103 
NAEC, 2012) with the objective of increasing domestic bank resources and size, stating that 104 
any commercial banks that could not conform to the stipulated levels by the end of 2010 105 
would be forced to merge, reduce the scope of their activities, or have their bank licence 106 
revoked. As a result, all small domestic JSBs faced an uphill battle to increase their capital 107 
levels by up to 10 times in a five-year period (NAEC, 2012). Calling for equity participation 108 
from large banks, private business groups and SOEs became a logical source of funds which, 109 
as a consequence, resulted in numerous and complex cross-ownerships involving JSBs (IMF, 110 
2012; NAEC, 2012). Most loans by these banks were subsequently allocated to related 111 
parties, rather than to the most profitable projects (Pincus, 2009; Nguyen et al., 2014). A lack 112 
of regulation relating to cross-ownership and the limited capability of supervisory 113 
departments worsened this situation. Under pressure from the need for all domestic banks to 114 
increase their capital capability, the SBV substantially loosened its regulations when 115 
permitting thirteen rural banks to transform into urban banks during the period 2006–2007 116 
(NAEC, 2012). In 2005, the total capital of these banks was estimated at 165 billion 117 
Vietnamese dong (VND), or 13.75 billion VND on average for each bank. With the 118 
introduction of Decree 141, each urban bank had to achieve a chartered capital level of at 119 
least 1,000 billion VND by the end of 2008 and of at least 3,000 billion VND by the end of 120 
2010.  121 
                                                          
1 There was a general reluctance by the authorities to engage in banking sector liberalisation, particularly in 
terms of the privatisation of state-owned banks and the entry of foreign-owned banks. But these were conditions 
for entry into the WTO.  
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Overall, the Vietnamese banking sector was significantly transformed by these reforms 122 
during the post-WTO entry period. As a result it is important to examine the effects of these 123 
reforms on bank efficiency performance while at the same time identifying any additional 124 
policy measures that could further improve bank efficiency in Vietnam.  125 
3. Literature review 126 
Findings in studies that employ stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) and DEA suggest that bank 127 
ownership type is a major determinant of bank efficiency in transition and emerging 128 
economies. Both cross country and single country approaches generally find that state-owned 129 
banks are the least efficient ownership type (see, for example, Jemric and Vujcic, 2002; 130 
Bonin et al., 2005a, 2005b; Fries and Taci, 2005; Grigorian and Manole, 2006) while the 131 
most efficient banks are foreign-owned (Hasan and Marton, 2003; Weill, 2003; and Bonin et 132 
al., 2005a). While cross country results tend to be quite uniform, single country studies often 133 
produce conflicting results (see Karas et al., 2010; Mamonov and Vernikov, 2017). Outcomes 134 
by ownership type can differ depending upon whether a cost or profit efficiency approach is 135 
adopted (Berger et al., 2000), as well as a country’s stage of development. Foreign banks in 136 
more developed countries are generally less cost efficient than domestic banks, while the 137 
converse holds for developing countries (see Berger et al., 2000; Hasan and Hunter, 138 
1996; and Chang et al., 1998).   139 
Major cross country efficiency studies focusing on Central and Eastern European Countries 140 
(CEECs) that engaged in a ‘big bang’ approach to banking reform, find that majority foreign-141 
owned banks are more cost efficient while government-owned banks are the least cost 142 
efficient (see, for example, Bonin et al., 2005a, 2005b; Fries and Taci, 2005; Koutsomanoli-143 
Filippaki et al., 2009; Yildirim and Philippatos, 2007; and Fang et al., 2011). Fries and Taci 144 
(2005) also find that while private banks are more cost efficient than state-owned banks, 145 
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major differences exist between them. Privatised banks with majority foreign ownership were 146 
the most cost efficient, followed by newly established domestic and foreign-owned private 147 
banks. Privatised banks with majority domestic ownership were the least efficient of the 148 
private banks, with state-owned banks the least efficient of all. Similar results are presented 149 
in Grigorian and Manole (2006). 150 
Single country efficiency studies find a generally superior performance by foreign-owned 151 
banks amongst CEECs. See, for example, Tochkov and Nenovsky (2009) for Bulgaria, 152 
Opiela (2000) and Nikiel and Opiela (2002) for Poland, Hasan and Marton (2000) for 153 
Hungary, Weill (2003) for the Czech Republic and Poland, and Jemric and Vujcic (2002) for 154 
Croatia. In contrast, Zajc (2006) finds that domestic banks were more cost-efficient than 155 
their foreign counterparts due to the latter either having higher start-up costs in a new 156 
market or from limited competition in the new market.     157 
Two separate hypotheses have been advanced to explain these differences in efficiency 158 
outcomes based on ownership type. The global advantage hypothesis and the home field 159 
advantage hypothesis. The former postulates that foreign banks have superior managerial 160 
skills, corporate policies and procedures, and better investment and risk management skills; 161 
resulting in lower costs, increased profitability and risk diversity. The home field advantage 162 
hypothesis argues that domestic banks are relatively more cost efficient because they do not 163 
have to deal with the same set of issues facing foreign banks including implicit market 164 
barriers, managerial and monitoring challenges, cultural and language differences and the 165 
complexity associated with negotiating foreign market regulation and supervisory 166 
arrangements (Belousova et al., 2018). Foreign banks face greater set-up costs in a new 167 
market and implicit and explicit discrimination that lowers their cost efficiency. A further 168 
dimension to the home field advantage hypothesis, and of direct relevance to this study, is 169 
that state-owned and domestic banks in emerging or transition economies may operate in an 170 
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environment that provides them with a distinct competitive advantage due to government 171 
implicit guarantees and access to lower cost funding (Karas et al., 2010; Vernikov, 2012). In 172 
addition, state-owned banks may benefit from discriminatory policy measures aimed at 173 
maintaining their size and dominance in the domestic market for political reasons. 174 
Country-specific results for transition countries adopting a more gradual and selective 175 
approach to bank reform, such as for Russia and China, have produced contradictory results 176 
for the cost efficiency of foreign, domestic private and state-owned banks. Karas et al. (2010) 177 
and Styrin (2005) find support for the global advantage hypothesis amongst Russian banks. 178 
For example, Karas et al. (2010) show that foreign banks were more cost efficient than 179 
domestic private banks due to their advanced banking technology and superior risk-180 
management and state-owned banks were comparable with domestic banks in terms of cost 181 
efficiency. Belousova et al. (2018) find that foreign-owned banks were the most profit 182 
efficient in Russia, followed by state-owned banks and private domestic banks.   183 
In contrast, Vernikov (2012) finds that due to government connections, state-owned Russian 184 
banks were more profitable and efficient relative to private and foreign-owned equivalents. 185 
Mamonov and Vernikov (2017) and Golovan et al. (2008) also find support for the home 186 
field advantage hypothesis for Russian banks with key state-owned banks being nearly as 187 
efficient as private domestic banks. Foreign-owned banks often have to create infrastructure 188 
and branch networks from scratch, recruit staff, attract clients, and build long-term relations, 189 
all of which reduce their cost and profit efficiency. In comparison, domestic and state-owned 190 
banks exhibit greater cost and profit efficiency due to their connections with government. 191 
Berger et al., (2009) examined the effect of partial and selective bank liberalisation in China 192 
from 1994 to 2003. The Big Four state-owned banks were found to be the least efficient, 193 
foreign banks the most efficient, and minority foreign ownership was associated with 194 
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significantly improved efficiency. Similar conclusions on the superior efficiency of private 195 
domestic and foreign-owned banks to that of state-owned banks was found by Zhang and 196 
Wang (2014), Xu (2011), Leung and Chan (2006) and Chen and Wang (2015). These studies 197 
provide evidence of the global advantage hypothesis operating in the Chinese banking sector, 198 
despite the close connection between major state-owned banks and the government. 199 
Unlike the gradual (partial) and selective liberalisation of banking systems approach adopted 200 
in Russia and China, the effects of such an approach on bank efficiency by ownership type 201 
has yet to be examined for Vietnam. Banking reform in Vietnam can be characterised as 202 
sluggish towards bank privatisation and unfriendly towards foreign investment. Hence, the 203 
home field advantage hypothesis could still be prevalent in Vietnam, and the effects of this on 204 
bank efficiency by ownership type have until now not been adequately analysed. As a ‘funds-205 
starved’ developing country, access to, and efficient allocation of, available funds through an 206 
efficient banking system is critical for its future economic development (Berger et al., 2009). 207 
The focus of this study is to identify whether Vietnam’s approach to bank reform following 208 
its entry into the WTO improved or diminished banking efficiency based on ownership type. 209 
4. Methodology 210 
This section outlines the methodology adopted in this paper to measure the technical 211 
efficiency of Vietnamese banks by ownership type covering the period 2005–2015. The 212 
following two sub-sections describe the methods used in this study for estimating technical 213 
efficiency and exploring possible determinants of bank efficiency in Vietnam, respectively. 214 
4.1 Measuring technical efficiency 215 
Consider an industry consisting of N firms (here: banks) operating through T years. By 216 
pooling available data we can obtain n bank-year observations (k=1,…,n). Each bank 217 
employs p inputs to produce q outputs. Let 𝑥𝑥 ∈ ℝ+
𝑝𝑝  denote a vector of p inputs and 𝑦𝑦 ∈ ℝ+
𝑞𝑞  218 
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denote a vector of q outputs. Under a given technology the production set of the industry can 219 
be defined by: 220 
℘ = {(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦) ∈ ℝ+
𝑝𝑝 × ℝ+
𝑞𝑞 : 𝑥𝑥 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 𝑦𝑦}        (1) 221 
We use the Farrell (1957) measure of output-oriented technical efficiency, defined by: 222 
𝛿𝛿(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦 ∈ ℘) ≡ 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥{𝛿𝛿 (𝑥𝑥, 𝛿𝛿𝑦𝑦)⁄ ∈ ℘, 𝛿𝛿 ≥ 1 }        (2) 223 
Under the assumption of free disposability of inputs and outputs and variable returns to scale, 224 
the DEA representation of the production set is: 2 225 
℘� =  �(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦) ∈ ℝ+
𝑝𝑝 × ℝ+
𝑞𝑞 :∑ 𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘=1 ≥ 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 , 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑞𝑞;  ∑ 𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘
𝑗𝑗𝑛𝑛
𝑘𝑘=1 ≤ 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 , 𝑗𝑗 =226 
1, … , 𝑝𝑝;  ∑ 𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘 = 1, 𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘 ≥ 0,𝑘𝑘 = 1, … ,𝑐𝑐 𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘=1 � (3) 227 
Farrell’s measure of technical efficiency (𝛿𝛿) is the reciprocal of the Shephard distance 228 
function (Shephard, 1970). The DEA output-oriented estimator of 𝛿𝛿 can be identified in the 229 
first stage by solving the following model: 230 
𝛿𝛿 =  𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥 𝛿𝛿 231 
Subject to:  232 
           ∑ 𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘=1 ≥ 𝛿𝛿𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖, 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑞𝑞;  233 
           ∑ 𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘
𝑗𝑗𝑛𝑛
𝑘𝑘=1 ≤ 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 , 𝑗𝑗 = 1, … ,𝑝𝑝;  234 
           ∑ 𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘 = 1; 𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘=1  235 
           𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘 ≥ 0,𝑘𝑘 = 1, … ,𝑐𝑐 (4) 236 
                                                          
2 The constant-returns-to-scale assumption is only appropriate when all firms are operating at their optimal scale 
(Charnes et al., 1978). In the banking sector banks are strongly impacted by regulations imposed by central 
banks, such as those on capital adequacy and loan-loss provisioning. In addition, in the case of Vietnam, private 
banks are discriminated against relative to state-owned banks, causing an imperfect business environment 
among different bank groups. Consequently, Vietnamese banks may not perform at their optimal scale. Hence, 




To analyse the possible factors influencing technical efficiency we utilise the Simar and 237 
Wilson (2007) method as discussed in the following sub-section. 238 
4.2 Double bootstrap DEA 239 
Regressing the estimated DEA efficiency (𝛿𝛿) against a group of explanatory variables in the 240 
second stage can be conducted using several estimation techniques such as OLS or Tobit 241 
regression. There are, however, serious problems raised in the literature regarding the use of 242 
the OLS and Tobit methods (Simar and Wilson, 2007). One issue is that the DEA estimates 243 
which are based on a finite sample are downward-biased (Simar and Wilson, 1998; Kneip et 244 
al., 1998; 2008). This is because the ‘best practice’ observations in the sample are employed 245 
to construct the production frontier rather than true efficient (but unobservable) observations. 246 
This means that coefficients derived from the second stage can be biased as well. It is also 247 
shown by Simar and Wilson (2007) that DEA efficiency scores are expected to be correlated 248 
with each other because the calculation of one firm’s efficiency incorporates the observations 249 
of all other firms in the same data set. Hence, direct regression analysis can also be invalid 250 
due to the dependency of the efficiency scores. In order to avoid these problems the double 251 
bootstrap DEA model of Simar and Wilson (2007) is used in this study to regress inefficiency 252 
scores against ownership indicators, policy-change indicators, bank characteristics and a time 253 
trend. In their proposed double bootstrap procedure, DEA bias corrected scores can then be 254 
used in a parametric bootstrap on the truncated maximum likelihood estimation. Confidence 255 
intervals can then be constructed for the regression parameters and the efficiency scores.  256 
Formally, a model regressing true inefficiency scores on environmental variables is described 257 
as: 𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘 = 𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘𝛽𝛽 + 𝜀𝜀𝑘𝑘 ≥ 1          (5) 258 
where 𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘 is a vector of explanatory variables for each bank-year observation (k=1,…,n), 259 
including a constant term, that are expected to influence the efficiency of banks under 260 
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consideration and 𝛽𝛽 is a vector of parameters with some statistical noise 𝜀𝜀𝑘𝑘. The true 261 
inefficiency scores (𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘) are unobservable and are replaced by DEA estimates from the first 262 
stage.3 263 
5. Data and specification of inputs and outputs 264 
5.1 Data source 265 
All four commercial bank ownership types in Vietnam are accounted for in this study: state-266 
owned commercial banks (SOCBs), joint-stock banks (JSBs), joint-venture banks (JVBs) and 267 
foreign-owned banks (FBs).4 However, because both FBs and JVBs contribute approximately 268 
10 per cent of banking assets in Vietnam (see Table 1), and are mostly or totally owned by 269 
foreigners, we classify them together in a group called foreign and joint-venture banks 270 
(FJVBs). Consequently, there are three bank ownership groups that we consider for empirical 271 
analysis: SOCBs, JSBs, and FJVBs. With respect to SOCBs, although several have been 272 
privatised and their equity sold to foreign and domestic private investors, most of these banks 273 
are still majority state-owned. JSBs are banks where the majority of ownership is held by 274 
private entities or SOEs, and where foreign ownership is capped at 30 per cent of total equity. 275 
The two bank ownership types which form the FJVB group in this study include JVBs and 276 
FBs. JVBs are normally established by an SOCB with one or more foreign counterparts 277 
where the foreign investors own at least half of the bank capital. FBs are banks where total 278 
capital is contributed to by foreign investors. Annual data on different bank ownership types 279 
for the period 2005 to 2015 was collected and pooled from financial statements; generating 280 
an unbalanced panel consisting of 317 observations. Due to the small sample size the sample 281 
                                                          
3 For a more detailed description of the double bootstrap approach used in this study, see Algorithm 2 of Simar 
and Wilson (2007, p.42) which is provided in Appendix A. This Algorithm was conducted using MATLAB 
codes provided by Associate Professor Valentine Zelenyuk, University of Queensland, Australia. The 
programming codes are not reported in this paper due to confidentiality requirements. 
4 See Table 1. 
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was pooled in order to overcome issues associated with a lack of statistical power (Salim et 282 
al., 2017).  283 
5.2 Inputs and outputs 284 
The intermediation and operating approaches are employed in this study to define bank inputs 285 
and outputs. Both approaches are widely used in the banking literature (Jiang et al., 2009; 286 
Arjomandi et al., 2014; Rosman et al., 2014; Belanès et al., 2015; Chiu et al., 2016; Salim et 287 
al., 2016). Under the intermediation approach, banks are seen as financial institutions whose 288 
primary modus operandi is the intermediation of funds between savers and borrowers 289 
(Rosman et al., 2014; Belanès et al., 2015; Chiu et al., 2016). The common inputs for this 290 
approach are labour expenditure, fixed assets and deposits while the outputs are loans and 291 
non-traditional assets, including trading securities and investments. These inputs and outputs 292 
are similarly employed in this study. Intermediation technical efficiency indicates the service-293 
related performance of a bank in terms of providing loans and advances to their customers 294 
relative to other banks. It is the most commonly adopted approach used in existing studies to 295 
establish the technical efficiency of Vietnamese banks (see, for example, Nguyen, 2007; 296 
Nguyen et al., 2012; 2014). 297 
The operating approach (or profit-oriented approach) views banks as decision-making units 298 
that direct their efforts towards the maximisation of profit (Leightner and Lovell, 1998). 299 
Berger and Mester (2003, p.80) state that the use of the operating approach “may help take 300 
into account unmeasured changes in the quality of banking services by including higher 301 
revenues paid for the improved quality, and may help capture the profit maximization goal by 302 
including both the costs and revenues”. This approach considers interest and non-interest 303 
income as a bank’s main outputs and defines interest and non-interest expenses as inputs. 304 
There is a consensus in the literature regarding the selection of these variables for analysing 305 
the operating (profit-oriented) efficiency of banks (Jiang et al., 2009; Arjomandi et al., 2014; 306 
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Salim et al., 2016). While used commonly in the literature this approach has not been 307 
considered in similar previous studies of Vietnamese banks. Both the intermediation and 308 
operating approaches are adopted in this study to help us better understand, and have a more 309 
complete picture, of the performance of Vietnamese banks from the perspective of both 310 
service-provision and profit-maximisation. 311 
6. Empirical analysis and results 312 
The empirical results are divided into a series of sub-sections. Section 6.1 presents an 313 
overview of the estimated original and bias-corrected efficiency scores. Sections 6.2 and 6.3 314 
detail the specification of the primary regression model and results. The remainder of the 315 
section presents the results from a generalised difference-in-differences model of the 316 
relationship. Section 6.4 provides the justification for the use of this model and section 6.5 317 
presents the results. Section 6.4 and 6.5 are included as means of addressing potential 318 
endogeneity concerns associated with self-selection and omitted variable bias when 319 
considering the influence of policy changes on bank efficiency.  320 
6.1 Results for conventional and bootstrap DEA measures of bank efficiency 321 
The estimated 95% confidence intervals for technical efficiencies under the intermediation 322 
and operating approaches are shown in Figures 1 and 2, respectively. The figures show the 323 
pooled sample observations (for the sample period of 2005–2015) ordered by values of the 324 
bias-corrected efficiencies. The bias-corrected efficiency scores (shown as Bias cor.) and the 325 
intervals presented in the figures are estimated using the bootstrap procedure with 2000 326 
replications. The confidence interval boundaries are shown by solid lines. As can be seen in 327 
the figures, the original efficiencies (Orig. eff.) are not included in the confidence intervals 328 
and lie just below the lower boundary; reflecting the theory behind the construction of these 329 
confidence intervals (Simar and Wilson, 1998). It is also apparent from the figures that bank 330 
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efficiency ranking based on bias-corrected efficiencies is in many cases different from that 331 
derived from the original efficiencies. In particular, the most efficient banks (with Orig. eff. = 332 
1) showed more dramatic deteriorations in the bias-corrected efficiencies in both figures. This 333 
issue is more noticeable under the intermediation approach. Overall, the results highlight the 334 
importance of using the bootstrapping method and bias-corrected estimates instead of the 335 
original scores. In the following sub-sections, regression variables used in this study are 336 
described followed by the empirical results. 337 
<FIGURES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE> 338 
6.2 Specification of the regression model 339 
Intermediation technical efficiency (ITE) and operating technical efficiency (OTE) are used 340 
as bank performance measures in two different regressions. The independent variables are 341 
classified into three main types: ownership indicators, policy-change indicators and control 342 
variables. The control variables include bank-specific and time-trend variables. The model 343 
can be presented as: Bank performance measure =  𝛾𝛾 + 𝜔𝜔1 Ownership Indicators + 𝜔𝜔2 344 
Policy Change Indicators + 𝜔𝜔3 Bank-specific control variables + 𝜔𝜔4 Time Trend variable + 345 
Error term           (6) 346 
The utilised variables are explained below and are summarised in Table 2. 347 
Ownership indicators 348 
There are three types of bank ownership considered in this study: state-owned commercial 349 
banks (SOCB), private banks (JSB) and foreign joint-venture banks (FJVB). Private banks 350 
are chosen as the base case and the other two ownership indicators (SOCB and FJVB) are 351 
included in the models. The indicator SOCB is set equal to one, indicating state-owned banks 352 
and zero for other bank types. A similar explanation is for the case of FJVB. Table 2 provides 353 
details on the definition of all environmental variables used in this study.  354 
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Policy change variables 355 
We also investigate the major policy changes which could potentially have an impact on 356 
Vietnam’s banking sector in the post-WTO era. Four reform measures are employed to 357 
capture the effect of these policies on banking efficiency by ownership type.  358 
(i) Business groups’ participation in the banking sector (BG) 359 
Several SOEs and private business groups were allowed by the government to participate in 360 
the banking sector and become the holding companies of JSBs. Subsequently, a complex set 361 
of cross-ownership relationships between industrial and banking entities were established. To 362 
consider this issue, an indicator (BG) is included in the model to capture JSBs which have at 363 
least 20 per cent of their total equity owned by SOEs and/or private business groups. BG is 364 
set to one for periods after business group participation.  365 
(ii) Privatisation of SOCBs (P) 366 
In the post-WTO period SOCBs were targeted for privatisation, but this process had to ensure 367 
that the government retained a predominant fraction of the bank’s capital. Following agency 368 
theory we would expect state ownership to negatively influence the performance of banks, 369 
and that state-owned banks would become more efficient after privatisation (La Porta et al., 370 
2002). An indicator (P) is added to the model to capture privatised banks and is set equal to 371 
one for periods after privatisation.  372 
(iii) Foreign strategic investment (FSI) 373 
Foreign investors could become involved in domestic banks by purchasing the equity of 374 
either SOCBs or JSBs, with the proportion of equity sold to foreign investors not exceeding 375 
30 per cent of total capital. FSI indicates banks with foreign involvement and is set equal to 376 
one for periods after foreign investment in these banks.  377 
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(iv) Transforming rural to urban JSBs (RU) 378 
An indicator (RU) is utilised to identify thirteen rural JSBs that were permitted to transfer to 379 
urban banks and is set equal to one for periods after the bank has been transformed. The 380 
reform changes included in this study are commonly regarded as the major changes in the 381 
literature regarding the Vietnamese banking sector (e.g., NAEC, 2012; IMF, 2012; World 382 
Bank, 2014). Several other non-trivial events, such as the global financial crisis, coincided 383 
with our study period, however it has been shown in previous studies that they were not as 384 
important in the context of the Vietnamese banking sector as the reforms considered in this 385 
study (see Nguyen et al., 2014; Nguyen and Simioni, 2015; Nguyen et al., 2016). 386 
Control variables 387 
Several other variables were chosen to capture the impact of bank characteristics on 388 
efficiency, including the loan-to-asset ratio (LA) representing bank preference for traditional 389 
assets, the equity-to-asset ratio (EA) as a proxy for financial soundness and the log of total 390 
bank assets as a proxy for bank size (SIZE). To control for the effect of time, a time-trend 391 
variable (T) was also included, which takes the value 1 for 2005, 2 for 2006 and so on, to 392 
capture the evolving nature of efficiency. Tables 3–6 provide descriptive statistics on bank 393 
distribution, inputs, outputs and explanatory variables used in this study. 394 
Table 3 shows the annual distribution of the banks by number for the whole sample as well as 395 
for each bank group. Table 3 indicates that joint-stock banks dominate the sample, making up 396 
approximately two thirds of the banks in each year. Tables 4 and 5 provide statistical 397 
descriptions of the above-mentioned variables. State-owned banks have the largest inputs and 398 
outputs and their assets are more concentrated in loans when compared to private and foreign 399 
and joint-venture banks. The results of Kruskal-Wallis rank tests, which are provided in 400 
Table 5, confirm these differences between the three bank types. Specifically, stark 401 
differences in efficiency under both intermediation and operating approaches can be 402 
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observed. The state-owned banks are the most efficient group as they have the lowest mean 403 
inefficiency values compared with JSBs and FJVBs counterparts under both approaches. 404 
Table 6 reveals the collinearity status between environmental variables. The results suggest 405 
that the privatisation indicator is highly correlated with the SOCB indicator, and that bank 406 
size is highly correlated with the SOCB indicator, the privatisation indicator, and the equity 407 
to asset and time trend variables. 408 
<TABLES 2–6 ABOUT HERE> 409 
6.3 Regression results 410 
The output-oriented technical inefficiency estimates are regressed against the set of 411 
regressors identified previously. To test the stability of the models and provide robust 412 
conclusions, six different model specifications are presented under each approach in Table 7. 413 
Similar results were obtained from all six models under each approach and are discussed in 414 
detail below.5 415 
<TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE> 416 
Ownership and efficiency 417 
Using domestic private banks as the base case, the SOCB indicator is employed to compare 418 
the efficiency of state-owned banks relative to these banks. The FJVB indicator plays a 419 
similar role in the regression models presented in Table 7. 420 
Under both the intermediation and operating approaches coefficients for the SOCB variable 421 
are negative across all five models that include this variable. The SOCB coefficients are also 422 
significant in models 3–5 indicating that publicly-owned banks are more efficient than 423 
domestic private-owned banks both in terms of services provided and profitability (see Table 424 
                                                          
5 It is worth highlighting again that inefficiency values are used as the dependent variable; therefore a negative 
coefficient implies a positive (beneficial) impact on efficiency. 
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7). The empirical evidence points out the key factors behind the outperformance of state-425 
owned banks. Firstly, these banks benefit from a scale effect as supported by the results for 426 
the SIZE coefficient for both the intermediation and operating approaches (see Table 7). The 427 
size of SOCBs, based on the mean value of total assets, is approximately 7 times larger than 428 
that of the JSBs (private banks), and 20 times larger than that of the FJVBs (see Table 5). 429 
Secondly, the positive impact of privatisation of a subset of SOCBs has improved the overall 430 
performance of the SOCBs relative to the JSBs and FJVBs (see Table 7).  431 
The coefficients on the FJVB indicator are negative across the five models and significant in 432 
models 2 to 5 under the intermediation approach. This suggests a superior performance of 433 
foreign joint-venture banks in terms of providing loans and advances in comparison with 434 
their domestic private counterparts (JSBs). None of the coefficients are significant under the 435 
operating approach. The better performance of FJVBs under the intermediation approach can 436 
be explained by their superior technology and expertise, which offset their lack of experience 437 
in the local market. Moreover, FDI enterprises, which contribute 18% of Vietnam’s GDP, 438 
prefer to utilise the banking services provided by FJVBs rather than domestic banks due to 439 
their relationship with the parent banks of FJVBs in their home countries. 440 
Business groups’ participation in the banking sector (BG) 441 
While the coefficients on the BG variable are insignificant under the intermediation approach 442 
they are significant and positive under the operating approach. This indicates that private 443 
banks with business group involvement underperformed when compared with the other banks 444 
from a profit efficiency perspective. This finding suggests that business groups participate in 445 
the banking sector in Vietnam as a way to secure their funding sources. However, this 446 
participation simultaneously undermines the operational (profitability) efficiency of these 447 
associate banks and the banking sector as a whole. 448 
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Privatisation of SOCBs (P) 449 
The coefficients on the ‘P’ variable, indicating state-owned banks experiencing privatisation, 450 
are found to be negative and highly significant across the different models and approaches. 451 
This suggests that privatised banks outperformed other banks based on both the operating and 452 
intermediation approaches. That is, the privatisation of state-owned banks improved both 453 
their service and operating efficiency despite their ongoing predominant state ownership. 454 
These results are consistent with that of Berger et al. (2009) for the case of China arising 455 
from WTO entry, but contradict the findings of Bonin et al. (2005b). Bonin et al. (2005b) 456 
argue that the partial privatisation of SOCBs, for the cases of Vietnam and China, cannot 457 
generate any performance improvement. This is because, as the dominant shareholder, the 458 
state is continuously in a strong position to run the banks, thereby reducing the likelihood of 459 
changes to corporate governance practices. Kraft et al. (2006) also state that a comprehensive 460 
privatisation of public banks, without sufficient changes to management, can reduce the 461 
performance of the banking industry. Our findings in the Vietnamese context do not lend 462 
support to this notion. 463 
Foreign strategic investment (FSI) 464 
The coefficients measuring the impact of foreign strategic investment on domestic private 465 
bank efficiency are found to be insignificant for both the intermediation and operating 466 
approaches, contrary to the findings of several studies in the literature including Berger et al. 467 
(2009). Berger et al. (2009) suggest that foreign involvement, even in terms of minority 468 
shareholding, is normally expected to have an unambiguously positive impact on banking 469 
performance. One may argue that the discriminatory measures in favour of state-owned banks 470 
in Vietnam are so significant that they offset traditional advantages arising from foreign 471 
investor strategic involvement in domestic private banks. Hence, unless such discriminatory 472 
measures are addressed, the efficiency benefits derivable from foreign investment in the 473 
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banking system will be limited, as will be the willingness of foreign investors to invest in 474 
domestic private banks. These results are certainly contrary to findings in the mainstream 475 
literature and suggest that the Vietnamese government needs to address this problem 476 
otherwise the benefits from foreign investment in domestic banks (expertise and capital) will 477 
be lost. The other factor is that minority foreign ownership will be insufficient in bringing 478 
about substantial changes to governance and management quality, due to the reluctance of 479 
majority domestic owners6 who have control of these JSBs in Vietnam. Only banks with 480 
majority foreign ownership (FJVB) are found to be more efficient than domestic private 481 
banks under the intermediation approach. Hence, the 30 per cent limit on foreign ownership 482 
of domestic bank equity should be reviewed based on these results. 483 
Transformed rural to urban JSBs (RU) 484 
The RU coefficients indicate that transformed JSBs from rural to urban banks are negatively 485 
and significantly associated with bank efficiency in all the models under both approaches. 486 
This outcome indicates that transformed banks are less efficient in terms of both their ability 487 
to provide intermediation services and generate profit when compared to their counterparts. 488 
They contribute negatively to overall banking sector efficiency in Vietnam. 489 
 There are two possible reasons for this. Firstly, their governance capability may have been 490 
inadequate given the increased range of their operations after becoming urban banks. 491 
Transformed banks were required to cover a significantly larger range of operations than they 492 
had done before. Their customer base and assets had increased substantially within a period 493 
of two or three years and many branches had opened nationwide, but this did not improve 494 
efficiency. The second potential reason is that insufficiently selective decisions by the SBV 495 
on awarding licences to rural banks resulted in a rapid growth of credit under inexperienced 496 
                                                          
6 The reluctance to conduct significant changes of bank governance and management can be due to the cultural 
and institutional differences. 
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bankers which led to increased risk taking and a failure to adequately diversify bank assets 497 
and generate profits. In reality, many of the small transformed JSBs used the majority of their 498 
credit to purchase property and stocks. As a result, this risk-taking behaviour led to an 499 
accumulation of bad loans, substantially increased risk-related costs and contributed to a 500 
decline in private and overall banking sector efficiency.  501 
Control variables 502 
Loans-to-assets ratio (LA) 503 
Under the intermediation approach we observe a positive relationship between the loans-to-504 
assets ratio and bank efficiency. This outcome is in line with the findings of Chortareas et al. 505 
(2012), and supports the argument that banks engaging in more traditional activities 506 
(transforming deposits into loans) are more efficient. This can be explained by the fact that an 507 
expansionary monetary policy was implemented to stimulate economic growth during the 508 
pre- and post-WTO periods in Vietnam, and the fact that loans represent the bulk of bank 509 
assets. Domestic banks were in a race to expand branches nationwide and attract deposits 510 
from households and corporations. Under human capital and physical resource constraints, 511 
banks maximised their capability to provide intermediation services and expected that the 512 
loans would enhance their profitability.  513 
Under the operating approach the regression results show a negative relationship between the 514 
LA ratio and efficiency, so the profit-oriented efficiency of private banks with a high LA 515 
ratio actually declined. The LA ratio is a proxy for liquidity risk, which considers the cost of 516 
attracting deposits and borrowing. Based on the results from this study it can be argued that 517 
Vietnamese banks can improve their (profit-oriented) efficiencies by decreasing traditional 518 
assets (loans and advances) and increasing non-traditional assets (investments and securities). 519 
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Equity-to-assets ratio (EA) 520 
The equity-to-assets ratio acts as a proxy for the financial soundness of a bank (Gropp and 521 
Heider, 2010; Fiordelisi et al., 2011). A bank with a higher EA ratio is safer in terms of 522 
capital and is in a stronger position to deflect risks relating to equity losses. A positive 523 
relationship between capital and efficiency, consistent with agency theory, is commonly 524 
found in the literature (e.g., Fries and Taci, 2005; Fiordelisi et al., 2011). According to 525 
Jeitschko and Jeung (2005) the managers of banks with less capital have a greater incentive 526 
to engage in moral hazard because they face less shareholder scrutiny when compared with 527 
banks that have higher capital ratios. Berger and De Young (1997) also point out that those 528 
banks reaching higher risk levels in the medium term have to employ more inputs to 529 
administer these higher risks, which results in declining efficiency and profitability. 530 
Regulators can also force banks to increase their capital and adequately disclose their risk-531 
related costs commensurate with the degree of risk assumed (Gropp and Heider, 2010). 532 
All five models employed in this study using the intermediation approach produce 533 
insignificant results. This contrasts substantially with the operating approach, which produces 534 
significant results of a negative association between the EA ratio and the profit-oriented 535 
efficiency in all five models (see Table 7). This uncommonly negative relationship between 536 
capital and efficiency may be due to the weak regulatory and supervisory framework of the 537 
Vietnamese banking sector. Under this, risks, especially credit risks, are inadequately 538 
accounted for and as a result risk-related costs and equity are often underestimated. 539 
Subsequently, figures on bank profitability and equity are often not commensurate with the 540 
level of risk (Laeven, 1999). Moreover, outdated Vietnamese accounting standards cannot 541 
keep up with changes in the risk profile of banks (IMF, 2012). These factors implicitly 542 
stimulate banks to provide more intermediate services (especially loans) and obtain a higher 543 
24 
 
rate of return. This cycle, repeated several times over, creates a negative relationship between 544 
capital and efficiency. 545 
Bank size (SIZE) 546 
The coefficient on bank size in model 1 of Table 7 is significant and negative under both the 547 
intermediation and the operating approach.7 These results suggest that larger banks exhibit 548 
greater intermediation (service-oriented) efficiency as well as operating (profit-oriented) 549 
efficiency. This aligns with other studies and supports the notion that economies of scale are 550 
beneficial in the banking sectors of transition and emerging economies (Bonin et al., 2005b; 551 
Berger et al., 2009). 552 
Time trend (T) 553 
The time trend coefficient indicates that banking efficiency increased between 2005 and 2015 554 
under the intermediation approach but no significant result was found for this variable under 555 
the operating approach. This is consistent with a rapid increase in credit and lending 556 
intermediation undertaken by the banking sector during the period of this study and that this 557 
has been achieved along with increased efficiency.  558 
6.4 Tests for bank-fixed effects and selection effects of policy changes 559 
Although the above analysis provides substantial insights into the relationship between policy 560 
changes and Vietnamese bank efficiency by ownership type, it is important to note that 561 
relying solely on the double bootstrap DEA results can be inadequate without considering 562 
potential endogeneity concerns. This arises because banking reforms which impacted some 563 
banks and not others might be due to self-selection or omitted variable(s). In other words, 564 
banks may have been selected into the various reforms based on particular ex ante 565 
                                                          
7 To avoid collinearity issues, the SIZE variable is not included in models (2) to (6) (mainly due to its high 
correlation with the SOCB and P indicators). In fact, when we tried to add Size in models (2) to (6) all the 
coefficients of the SOCB indicator become insignificant. Thus, it is only incorporated in model (1) where the 
ownership indicators and other policy change indicators are excluded. 
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characteristics which may lead to bias in the measurement of the effects of the reforms on 566 
efficiency levels. For example, foreign investors would select to invest in more promising 567 
JSBs based on pre-reform assessments of financial performance. Then the positive effects of 568 
foreign ownership on the efficiency of JSBs are not due to the participation of foreign 569 
investors but due to their selection based on ex ante characteristics. Therefore, in order to 570 
provide additional robustness to the results provided in Table 7, a generalised difference-in-571 
differences model with multiple treatments is included in this and the subsequent sections. 572 
Despite this latter model being limited in its capacity to address time-variant unobservable 573 
variable concerns, it does reduce bias in the estimation of policy effects by controlling for 574 
time-invariant confounders. 575 
To justify the inclusion of a two-way fixed effects model, both the Breusch and Pagan (1980) 576 
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) and Hausman (1978) chi square statistics were calculated for the 577 
intermediation and operating efficiency models. Firstly, the Breusch and Pagan (1980) LM 578 
statistic identifies the existence of dynamic heterogeneity in the model. By using a set of OLS 579 
residuals it tests the null hypothesis that group effects do not exist (Greene, 2003). Secondly, 580 
the Hausman (1978) chi square statistic tests the appropriateness of employing a fixed effects 581 
or least squares dummy variable (LSDV) model relative to a generalised least squares (GLS) 582 
specification. The Hausman (1978) chi square statistic tests the null hypothesis that 583 
individual effects are appropriately modelled through the implementation of a random effects 584 
estimator (Judge et al. 1985; Green, 2003). With respect to both intermediation efficiency 585 
(column 1) and operating efficiency (column 2) regressions in Table 8, a two-way fixed 586 
effects regression is justified on the basis that both the Breusch and Pagan (1980) LM and 587 
Hausman (1978) chi square statistics are rejected at the 5 per cent level. Both the 588 
intermediation and operating efficiency regressions produce substantially large Breusch–589 
Pagan LM statistics (Hausman statistics) of 129.14 (34.12) and 133.94 (30.18) respectively, 590 
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with all results statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. Thus, the results from the two 591 
tests support the use of two-way fixed effects in accounting for heterogeneity in the dataset 592 
and facilitating the analysis of treatment effects with respect to the policy variables.  593 
6.5 Two-way fixed effects regression: policy effects after controlling for time-invariant 594 
covariates 595 
The generalised difference-in-differences (DID) (two-way fixed effects with multiple 596 
treatments) regression is a common method used in policy evaluation in the face of multiple 597 
treatments over a number of time periods (see Imbens and Wooldridge, 2002; Bertrand et al., 598 
2004; Angrist and Pishke, 2009). This study incorporates the empirical framework 599 
established by Bertrand et al., (2004) and Hansen (2007) as a basis for conducting difference-600 
in-differences with multiple treatments. At the individual level the equation employed in this 601 
study is established as: 602 
𝛿𝛿ℎ𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 + 𝛾𝛾𝑧𝑧ℎ𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 +  𝜃𝜃𝑔𝑔 + 𝜆𝜆𝑔𝑔 + εhgt                                                                        (7) 603 
Here, h is an index for individual banks (h=1,…,N), g represents the bank groups (including 604 
privatised banks; banks with foreign strategic investment; banks with business participation 605 
and urban-rural transformed banks) and t is the index for time (t=1,…,T). 𝛿𝛿ℎ𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 denotes the 606 
bank performance measure (either intermediation or operating efficiency). 𝛼𝛼 is a constant, 607 
𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 is a policy change indicator that indicates bank h belongs to group g in year t, 𝑧𝑧ℎ𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 is a 608 
vector of individual-specific control variables (which includes LA and EA ratios) and  𝜀𝜀ℎ𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 is 609 
the error term. Bank fixed effects are denoted as 𝜃𝜃𝑔𝑔 and a full set of year effects are captured 610 
in 𝜆𝜆𝑔𝑔. In addition, robust standard errors are clustered at the bank-level.  611 
The treatment effect of each policy is identified by their respective 𝛽𝛽 coefficient, which 612 
captures the average treatment effect for each policy. The underlying intuition for this result 613 
is that the year effects (𝜆𝜆𝑔𝑔) provide a control for the post-regulation dummy, and bank fixed 614 
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effects (𝜃𝜃𝑔𝑔) act as the control for the treatment dummy for each policy intervention. The use 615 
of year and bank fixed effects therefore create the conditions for the measurement of policy 616 
effects independent of time-invariant confounders. 617 
The two-way fixed effects regressions in Table 8 supplement the main analysis in Table 7, 618 
and isolate ‘within-bank’ variation through the implementation of both bank and year fixed 619 
effects. For the purposes of consistency the directionality and interpretation of results 620 
provided in Table 8 are comparable to those in Table 7. This method is appropriate for testing 621 
the robustness of the main results provided in Table 7, given that we focus on the impact of 622 
several reform measures instituted by the Vietnamese government over a ten year period. By 623 
isolating the ‘within’ bank variation over time it reduces the likelihood of bias in the 624 
estimation of treatment effects brought about by features of the banking system which may 625 
have had a direct impact on efficiency. Given that this method controls for observed and 626 
unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity in regressions, variables representing bank 627 
ownership type are not included in the regression analysis in Table 8.  628 
<TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE> 629 
While the results from sub-section 6.3 point to no significant difference between banks with 630 
business participation and other banks (see Table 7) under the intermediation approach, the 631 
coefficients on the BG variable are significantly negative in model 1 of Table 8. 632 
Consequently, after controlling for time-invariant characteristics, the results in Table 8 633 
indicate that the participation of business groups in private banks increases the intermediation 634 
efficiency of these banks over the long term. The reason for this is that these groups are 635 
contributors to bank equity, which in turn enables them to attract more deposits for lending. 636 
A substantial portion of these loans, however, are allocated to the subsidiaries of these 637 
groups, which raises concerns regarding the associated increase in credit risk. A high level of 638 
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credit risk can lead to high loan-loss provisioning costs and lower profitability/operating 639 
efficiency but this issue is found to be insignificant in our regression models where time-640 
invariant effects are not accounted for (see Table 8). The results in Table 8 support a positive 641 
and dynamic influence of privatisation on the operating efficiency of state-owned banks. The 642 
policy of privatisation has forced privatised banks to increase their management quality, 643 
adhere to more rigorous banking standards, and increase their capital. In the long term, these 644 
banks are expected to operate more efficiently, consistent with their increased 645 
commercialisation. The results in Table 8 are also consistent with those in Table 7 in that 646 
privatised banks outperform the others under the operating approach. 647 
Private banks that transformed from rural to urban have experienced a decline of 648 
intermediation efficiency between 2005 and 2015 (see Table 8). This result is consistent with 649 
the findings in Table 7 and indicates that transformed banks have a significant and negative 650 
effect on intermediation efficiency. Although the policy of transformation encouraged these 651 
banks to broaden their geographical reach and the scope of their intermediating services, the 652 
quality of their management has not improved in line with this growth. The end result is a 653 
decline in intermediation efficiency. Transforming rural into urban banks has contributed 654 
unambiguously to a negative impact on bank intermediation efficiency. Table 8 also supports 655 
the result in Table 7, which suggest that foreign strategic investment has not significantly 656 
impacted the intermediation and operating efficiency of domestic private banks.  657 
7. Conclusion  658 
The reform of banking sectors has diverged amongst transition economies and each transition 659 
can be categorised into either partial or full liberalisation. While the latter advocates a fair 660 
and competitive market for all banks, the former can reflect a desire by government to control 661 
and employ the sector as a tool to serve its political purposes and, in doing so, favour one 662 
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type of bank over another. This study has examined the impact of reform measures on bank 663 
efficiency in the context of Vietnam’s transition economy. 664 
Using data for Vietnamese banks covering the pre- and post-WTO period (2005–2015) and 665 
applying the DEA double bootstrapping methodology to measure banking efficiency, under 666 
the intermediation and operating approaches, it was found that the state-owned bank group 667 
was the most efficient. In contrast, and contrary to the mainstream view in the literature, 668 
joint-stock banks were found to be the least efficient.  669 
In terms of the impact of reform measures on banking efficiency the results show that 670 
transforming rural to urban banks contributed negatively to the intermediation efficiency 671 
performance of private banks and the overall banking sector under both the DEA and DID 672 
approaches. Negative results for bank operating efficiency were also observed under DEA. 673 
The privatisation of SOCBs was found to improve both their intermediation and operating 674 
efficiency using DEA, but was found to only improve their operating efficiency using DID. 675 
Foreign strategic investment exerted an insignificant impact on both private bank 676 
intermediation and operating efficiency using both DEA and DID. While the participation of 677 
business groups in the domestic banking sector improved intermediation efficiency but had 678 
no significant impact on operating efficiency using DID, using DEA indicated that they 679 
exerted a negative impact on operating efficiency and had no significant impact on 680 
intermediation efficiency. Under the DEA model, bank size positively impacts intermediation 681 
and operating efficiency and, paradoxically, a negative relationship between capital and 682 
operating efficiency is also found in this study. 683 
Based on these findings, several key policies can be recommended to improve the efficiency 684 
of Vietnamese banks. First, the privatisation of SOCBs can result in a positive and dynamic 685 
effect on the operating efficiency of banks, and possibly also intermediation efficiency. 686 
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Hence, one may argue that it can and should be applied more widely in the sector. Second, it 687 
is found that transformed JSBs from rural to urban banks are less efficient under the 688 
intermediation and operating approach using DEA, while this is only found to be the case for 689 
intermediation efficiency using DID. Since most of the transformed JSBs are small banks 690 
(their mean value of total assets is equivalent to approximately one third of the mean value 691 
for the overall Vietnamese banking system)8, one way of enhancing their efficiency may be 692 
to increase their size through either forced merger or acquisition. This is consistent with the 693 
results from DEA which suggest that there are benefits to be gained from economies of scale 694 
(SIZE) in the banking sector in terms of both intermediation and operating efficiency. 695 
Policymakers should, therefore, actively encourage consolidation of the banking sector 696 
through mergers and acquisitions, with transformed JSBs being an important priority. Other 697 
small and inefficient banks should be considered to take part in this process as well, 698 
regardless of their ownership types. 699 
Third, foreign strategic investment (up to 30% of bank equity) has not significantly impacted 700 
the efficiency of domestic banks and the reasons for this need to be studied in more detail. 701 
This could arise due to the benefits of foreign investment being nullified by remaining 702 
discriminatory measures and barriers which need to be addressed. In addition, the limit of 703 
30% foreign ownership of domestic bank equity should be increased. Fourth, the paradoxical 704 
negative relationship between the equity-to-asset ratio and operating efficiency found under 705 
DEA is indicative of a weak Vietnamese banking regulatory and supervisory framework. 706 
Hence policymakers need to improve the quality of the regulatory and supervisory framework 707 
of the banking system, and in doing so this may improve the management of risk in the sector 708 
and require banks to be more accountable for incurring risk-related costs.   709 
                                                          
8 According to our calculations, the mean value of total assets for transformed JSBs is 18,388,534 million VND 
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Table 1: Structure of the Vietnamese banking sector by ownership type, 2007, 2011 and 2016 
 December 2007  December 2011  December 2016 
 Total Assets  
(in VND 
trillions) 




 Total Assets  
(in VND 
trillions) 




 Total Assets  
(in VND 
trillions) 






931.5 54 81  1912.3 40 69  3861.9 48 104 
Joint-stock banks 597.7 34 52  2285.8 48 82  3422.8 42 92 
Foreign and joint-
venture banks 
204 12 18  552.4 12 20  828.3 10 22 
All banks 1733.2 100 152  4750.5 100 171  8113 100 218 





Table 2: Summary of the employed regression variables 
 
  
Variables Abbreviations Descriptions 
Bank performance measures   
Intermediation technical efficiency ITE Obtained using DEA with three inputs (labour cost, fixed assets and deposits) and two outputs (loans and other 
assets). 
Operating technical efficiency OTE Obtained using DEA with two inputs (interest expenses and non-interest expenses) and two outputs (interest income 
and non-interest income). 
Ownership indicators     
State-owned banks SOCB Indicator indicating state-owned banks. Equal to one for all periods a bank is state-owned. 
Foreign and joint-venture banks FJVB Indicator indicating foreign and joint-venture banks. Equal to one for all periods if a bank is a foreign or joint venture 
bank. 
Policy change indicators    
SOCB privatisation P Indicator indicating SOCBs that experienced privatisation between 2005 and 2015. Equal to one for the periods after 
the privatisation of a bank. 
Foreign capital participation  FSI Indicator indicating a bank sold a minor proportion of its equity (not exceeding 30 per cent) to foreign investors. 
Equal to one for the periods after foreign capital investment in the bank. If an SOCB went through foreign capital 
participation and privatisation the variable will be set to zero due to the fact that foreign capital participation is one of 
many measures during the process of privatising state-owned banks.  
Business group participation in 
JSBs 
BG Indicator indicating JSBs have experienced equity participation by SOEs and/or private business groups. Equal to one 
for the periods after business group participation in a bank. 
Rural-urban transformation  RU Indicator indicating JSBs that transformed from rural to urban banks. Equal to one for the periods after transformation 
of a bank. 
Control variables   
Loans-to-assets ratio LA The ratio of loans to assets measures the preference for traditional banking activities. 
Equity-to-assets ratio EA The ratio of equity to assets measures the financial soundness of a bank. 
Size SIZE The log form of total bank assets is used as a proxy for bank size 
Time trend  T Time trend variable (2005 = 1, 2006 = 2, … , 2015 = 11). 
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Table 3: Annual distribution of the banks for the whole sample and each bank group  
Year No. of JSB No. of SOCB No. of FJVB Total 
2005 11 5 1 17 
2006 14 5 1 20 
2007 19 5 2 26 
2008 24 5 2 31 
2009 25 5 3 33 
2010 25 5 4 34 
2011 25 5 6 36 
2012 24 5 6 35 
2013 21 4 4 29 
2014 21 4 5 30 
2015 18 4 4 26 
Total 227 52 38 317 




Table 4: Statistical description of the variables for all banks 
  Min Max Mean S.D. 
Dependent variables     
Intermediation technical efficiency 1 2.9343 1.3136 0.2877 
Operating technical efficiency 1 2.8328 1.3096 0.2554 
Ownership indicators     
State-owned Banks 0 1 0.1672 0.2374 
Foreign and Joint-venture Banks 0 1 0.1199 0.3248 
Policy change indicators     
SOCB privatisation 0 1 0.1041 0.3054 
Foreign strategic investment  0 1 0.1640 0.3703 
Business group participation in JSBs 0 1 0.3912 0.488 
Rural-urban transformation  0 1 0.2114 0.4083 
Bank characteristics     
Loans-to-assets ratio 0.1293 0.9496 0.5322 0.1423 
Equity-to-assets ratio 0.0107 0.8006 0.1268 0.097 
Total asset (in Million VND) 451,481 741,815,049 63,257,994 115,595,664 
Time trend  1 11 6.3312 2.9012 
Inputs (Is) and outputs (Os) of the intermediation approach in Million VND 
Labour expenses (I) 7,491 6,045,583 508,541 894,059 
Fixed assets (I) 9,117 19,390,861 643,432 1,294,542 
Deposits (I) 383,030 310,512,810 43,566,662 59,979,382 
Loans (O) 260,542 250,177,717 32,203,788 52,539,522 
Non-traditional assets (O) 1,892 59,277,701 8,603,438 10,985,510 
Inputs (Is) and outputs (Os) of the operating approach in Million VND 
Interest expenses (I) 2,210 24,953,747 2,766,238 4,031,607 
Non-interest expenses (I) 13,441 9,041,865 987,793 1,501,983 
Interest income (O) 25,713 38,103,230 4,126,277 5,964,089 
Non-interest income (O) 1,462 4,461,620 513,555 774,120 
Notes: Number of observations is 317. The figures for total asset, inputs and outputs presented are discounted by the inflation rate for the benchmark year 2005. 
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Table 5: Statistical description of the variables for each bank group 
  Private banks   State-owned banks   Foreign and Joint-
venture banks 
  Kruskal 
Wallis  
(227 observations) (52 observations) (38 observations) rank test 
  Mean Median   Mean Median   Mean Median   (Chi-Square) 
Dependent variables 
          
Intermediation technical efficiency 1.3742 1.3538  1.1479 1.0620  1.1882 1.0881  38.1051*** 
Operating technical efficiency 1.3475 1.3169  1.1666 1.0990  1.2804 1.2620  32.8920*** 
Bank characteristics  
          
Loans-to-assets ratio 0.5039 0.5015  0.6453 0.6575  0.5553 0.5385  46.5628*** 
Equity-to-assets ratio 0.1294 0.1021  0.0591 0.0599  0.2239 0.1848  115.9908*** 
Total asset (in Million VND) 33,304,604 17,163,207  230,109,366 167,926,627  11,502,526 5,977,193  98.3674*** 
Time trend  6.304 6  5.7692 6  7.2632 7.5   
Inputs (Is) and outputs (Os) of the intermediation approach in Million VND 
  
Labour expenses (I) 253,218 162,623  1,886,298 1,830,568  148,410 105,901  85.0420*** 
Fixed assets (I) 495,428 354,096  1,712,491 1,817,697  64,636 46,677  108.5739*** 
Deposits (I) 24,675,203 20,705,710  151,982,038 160,560,882  8,060,390 5,972,747  101.4054*** 
Loans (O) 14,825,513 12,003,522  127,633,721 138,217,241  5,427,787 5,477,247  97.0019*** 
Non-traditional assets (O) 5,835,428 3,416,682  25,858,500 25,416,975  1,526,464 492,980  88.8194*** 
Inputs (Is) and outputs (Os) of the operating approach in Million VND 
  
Interest expenses (I) 1,684,662 1,354,768  9,330,964 9,734,419  243,927 259,173  124.8364*** 
Non-interest expenses (I) 546,348 395,523  3,461,134 3,534,419  240,274 145,301  86.2677*** 
Interest income (O) 2,442,316 2,073,037  14,057,935 14,665,189  595,040 497,192  107.2766*** 
Non-interest income (O) 295,779 169,883   1,728,833 1,761,397   151,467 99,393   68.7230*** 
Notes: The figures for total assets, inputs and outputs presented are discounted by the inflation rate for the benchmark year 2005. *** indicates a statistically significant 
difference between groups at the 1 per cent level. Kruskal-Wallis tests show that intermediation efficiency, operating efficiency, explanatory variables (loan-to-equity ratio, 
equity-to-asset ratio and total asset), outputs (loans, non-traditional assets, interest income, non-interest income) and inputs (labour expenses, fixed assets, deposits, interest 
expenses, non-interest expenses) are different across the three bank categories. 
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Table 6: Correlation matrix of environmental variables 
  SOCB FJVB P FSI BG RU LA EA SIZE T 
SOCB 1.0000          
FJVB -0.1393 1.0000         
P 0.7608 -0.1258 1.0000        
FSI -0.1985 -0.1635 -0.1510 1.0000       
BG -0.3591 -0.2958 -0.2732 -0.3551 1.0000      
RU -0.2320 -0.1911 -0.1765 -0.2293 0.3609 1.0000     
LA 0.3457 0.0598 0.2396 -0.1373 -0.2411 -0.0733 1.0000    
EA -0.3092 0.3695 -0.2230 -0.1388 0.0402 0.2475 -0.0575 1.0000   
SIZE 0.5605 -0.3029 0.4979 0.1888 -0.2386 -0.2957 0.1787 -0.5505 1.0000  
T -0.0774 0.1185 -0.0389 0.0816 0.0578 0.0874 -0.0679 0.0337 0.4239 1.0000 
Notes: SOCB is state-owned banks; FJVB is foreign-joint venture bank: P is privatisation indicator; FSI is foreign strategic investment: BG: business group participation; RU 
is rural-urban transformation; LA is loan to asset ratio; EA is equity to asset ratio; SIZE is log of total assets; T is time trend variable. 
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Table 7: Regressing environmental variables on bank performance measures  
  
Intermediation technical efficiency (317 observations)   Operating technical efficiency (317 observations) 
1 2 3 4 5 6   1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant term 4.3714*** 2.2911*** 2.2841*** 2.2995*** 2.2967*** 2.2461*** 
 
3.5285*** 0.9467*** 0.9668*** 0.8458*** 0.958*** 0.9412*** 
 (0.3197) (0.1184) (0.1233) (0.1276) (0.1210) (0.1310)  
(0.3554) (0.1564) (0.1598) (0.1645) (0.1500) (0.1621) 
Ownership              State-owned banks, SOCB  -0.1847 -0.3791*** -0.3933*** -0.3401*** -0.0993   -0.1008 -0.5396*** -0.4307*** -0.4336*** -0.0229 
  (0.1349) (0.1059) (0.1065) (0.1000) (0.1402)   
(0.1328) (0.1258) (0.1246) (0.1146) (0.1354) 
Foreign and Joint-venture banks, FJVB  -0.2066* -0.1994* -0.2156** -0.1066* -0.0531   
-0.1131 -0.1426 -0.0356 0.0085 0.0436 
  (0.0968) (0.0938) (0.0981) (0.0936) (0.1079)   
(0.0945) (0.0942) (0.0997) (0.0964) (0.1088) 
Policy Change Indicators              
Privatisation Indicator, P  -0.3938**    -0.3642**   -1.0137***    -0.9642*** 
  (0.1883)    (0.1783)   (0.2680)    (0.2513) 
Foreign Strategic Investment Indicator, FSI   0.0393   0.1309    
-0.177   -0.0349 
   (0.0646)   (0.0867)    
(0.0902)   (0.1070) 
Business Participation Indicator, BG    -0.011  0.0104     
0.1373**  0.0778* 
    (0.0562)  (0.0681)     
(0.0665)  (0.0369) 
Rural-Urban transformation Indicator, RU     0.1931*** 0.2329***      0.2454*** 0.2160*** 
     (0.0607) (0.0671)      (0.0715) (0.0743) 
Control Variables              
Loan to Asset ratio, LA -1.3968*** -1.4135*** -1.4011*** -1.4042*** -1.4019*** -1.3864*** 
 
0.4260** 0.5676** 0.5942** 0.6502*** 0.5741** 0.5494** 
 (0.1806) (0.1973) (0.2101) (0.2129) (0.2091) (0.1968)  
(0.1842) (0.2172) (0.2203) (0.2158) (0.2117) (0.2024) 
Equity to Asset ratio, EA  0.1546 0.1546 0.1400 -0.1440 -0.1511   
0.9006*** 0.7703*** 0.8257*** 0.4904* 0.5423** 
  (0.2744) (0.2668) (0.2619) (0.2767) (0.2802)   (0.2870) (0.2968) (0.2975) (0.3027) (0.2944) 
SIZE -0.1375***       -0.1507***      
 (0.0186)       
(0.0229)      
Time Trend, T  -0.0298*** -0.0306*** -0.0300*** -0.0343*** -0.0354***   
-0.0126 -0.0099 -0.0137 -0.0176 -0.0179 
    (0.0093) (0.0093) (0.0090) (0.0090) (0.0092)     (0.0100) (0.0102) (0.0100) (0.0099) (0.0102) 
Note: The coefficients with *, ** and *** are significant at 10, 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively. Standard errors at the bank-level are provided in parentheses.
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Table 8: Tests for bank-fixed effects and selection effects of policy changes 
  (1)  (2) 
  Intermediation Efficiency Scores  Operating Efficiency Scores 




Policy Change Indicators     
















Control Variables     








Bank Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes 
Year Effects  Yes  Yes 
R-Squared (within)  0.3207  0.1563 
Number of observations  317  317 
Notes: The coefficients with **, or *** are significant at 5, and 1 per cent levels, respectively. Cluster-robust standard errors at the bank-level are provided in parentheses. All 
regressions include bank and year fixed effects. Intermediation efficiency is the dependent variable for model (1) and operation efficiency is the dependent variable for model 
(2). All ‘policy change indicators’ are set to one for the period after the introduction of the policy for banks in the treatment group, and zero otherwise. Control variables 
include the Loan to Assets ratio and the Equity to Assets ratio. Due to collinearity issues in the two-way fixed effects model the ownership variables on bank type JSB, SOCB 
and FJVB were not included in the analysis. The regressions provided in Table 7 were re-estimated with the use of Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors. This additional 
analysis was completed to assess whether or not issues associated with cross-sectional dependence were present in the sample. Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors 
account for potential herding behaviour amongst banks and spillover effects which otherwise would not be captured with the use of cluster-robust standard errors. We found 






















1 101 201 301











1 101 201 301
Bias-cor. Orig. eff. Upper bound. Lower bound.
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Appendix A: Double-bootstrap two-stage DEA algorithm 
1) Use the original data in 𝒫𝒫𝑛𝑛 = {𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘,𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘}𝑘𝑘=1𝑛𝑛  to compute 𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘 = 𝛿𝛿(𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘 ,𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘\℘�)∀𝑘𝑘 = 1, … ,𝑐𝑐 by DEA, 
using equation (4) 
2) Use the method of maximum likelihood to obtain an estimate ?̂?𝛽 of 𝛽𝛽 as well as an estimate 𝜎𝜎�𝜀𝜀  𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀 
in the truncated regression of 𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘 on 𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘 using m<n observations when 𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘 > 1 
3) Loop over the next four steps (3.1-3.4) L1 times to obtain n sets of bootstrap estimates ℬ𝑘𝑘 =
{?̂?𝛿𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘∗ }𝑘𝑘=1
𝐿𝐿1 :  
       3.1) For each 𝑘𝑘 = 1, … ,𝑐𝑐 draw 𝜀𝜀𝑘𝑘 from the 𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎�ℇ2) distribution with left-truncation at (1 −
𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘?̂?𝛽) 
       3.2) Again for each 𝑘𝑘 = 1, … ,𝑐𝑐, compute 𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘∗ = 𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘?̂?𝛽 + 𝜀𝜀𝑘𝑘 
       3.3) Set 𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘∗ = 𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘 ,𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘∗ = 𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘/𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘∗ for all 𝑘𝑘 = 1, … ,𝑐𝑐 
       3.4) Using equation (4) to compute ?̂?𝛿𝑘𝑘∗ = 𝛿𝛿(𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘 ,𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘)\℘�∗∀𝑘𝑘 = 1, … ,𝑐𝑐 where ℘�∗ is obtained by 
replacing (𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘 ,𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘) in equation (3) with (𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘∗ ,𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘∗)from step (3.3) 
4) For each 𝑘𝑘 = 1, … ,𝑐𝑐 compute the bias-corrected estimator 𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘 using the bootstrap estimates in ℬ𝑘𝑘 
obtained in step (3.4) and the original estimate 𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘, where 𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘 = 2𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘 − 𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘∗  
5) Use the method of maximum likelihood to estimate the truncated regression of 𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘 on 𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘, yielding 
estimate ?̂̂?𝛽,𝜎𝜎�� 
6) Loop over the next three steps (6.1-6.3) L2 times to obtain a set of bootstrap estimates 𝒞𝒞 =
{(?̂̂?𝛽∗,𝜎𝜎��𝜀𝜀∗)𝑘𝑘}𝑘𝑘=1
𝐿𝐿2 : 
      6.1) For each 𝑘𝑘 = 1, … ,𝑐𝑐 draw  𝜀𝜀𝑘𝑘 from the 𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎��) distribution with left-truncation at (1 − 𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘?̂̂?𝛽) 
      6.2) Again for each 𝑘𝑘 = 1, … ,𝑐𝑐, compute 𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘∗∗ = 𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘?̂̂?𝛽 + 𝜀𝜀𝑘𝑘 
      6.3) Use the method of maximum likelihood to estimate the truncated regression of 𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘∗∗on 𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘, 
yielding estimate (?̂̂?𝛽∗,𝜎𝜎��𝜀𝜀∗)  
7) Use the bootstrap values in 𝒞𝒞 and the original estimate ?̂̂?𝛽,𝜎𝜎�� to construct estimated confidence 
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